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CHAPTERS
Principles and Sources of
the Law of Armed Conflict
5.1 WAR AND THE LAW

A

rticle 2 of the United Nations Charter reguires all nations to settle their
international disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of other
nations. The United Nations Charter prohibits the use of force by member
nations except as an enforcement action taken by or on behalf of the United
Nations (as in the Gulf War) or as a measure of individual or collective
self-defense. 1 It is important to distinguish between resort to armed conflict, and
the law governing the conduct of armed co~ct. Regardless of whether the use
of armed force in a particular circumstance is prohibited by the United Nations
Charter (and therefore unlawful),2 the manner in which the resulting armed

1. United Nations Charter, arts. 2(3), 2(4}, 42 & 51-53. These provisions concerning the use
of force fonn the basis of the modem rules governing the resort to anned conflict, or jus ad bellum.
See paragraph 4.1.1 and notes 7-9 thereunder (pp. 250 - 253). See also Kellogg-Briand Pact, or the
Treaty for the Renunciation ofWar as an Instrument ofNational Policy, Paris, 27 August 1928, 46
Stat. 2343, T.S. No. 796, 2 Bevans 732,94 L.N.T.S. 57.
The relationship concerning resort to war (jus ad bellum), relations between combatant nations
during war (jus in bello), and the law of neutrality in the late 20th Century, is considered in
Greenwood, The Concept of War in Modem International Law, 36 Int'l & Compo L.Q. 283
(1987). See also Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defense (2d ed. 1994) at 155-61; Green, The
Contemporary Law of Anned Conflict (1993) at 59-60. Jus in bello is discussed further in note 4
(p.290).
2. Wars violating these principles are often called "aggressive" or "illegal" wars. Military
personnel may not be lawfully punished simply for fighting in an anned conflict, even iftheir side is
clearly the aggressor and has been condemned as such by the United Nations. This rule finds finn
support in the Allied war crimes trials that followed World War II. For the crime ofplanning and
waging aggressive war (defined as a crime against peace, see paragraph 6.2.5, note 55 (p. 343», the
two post-World War II International Military Tribunals punished only those high ranking civilian
and military officials engaged in the fonnulation of war-making policy. The twelve subsequent
Proceeding; at Nuremberg rejected all efforts to punish lesser officials for this crime merely because
they participated in World War II. See DA Pam 27-161-2, at 221-51.
Because nations have traditionally claimed that their wars are wars ofself-defense, the courts of the
Western Allies were unwilling to punish officials of the Axis powers for waging aggressive war if
the officials were not at the policy-making level ofgovernment. One of the American tribunals at
(continued...)
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conflict is conducted continues to be regulated by the law of anned conflict. 3
(For purposes of this publication, the tenn "law of anned conflict" is
synonymous with "law ofwar.,,)4

5.2 GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT
The law of anned conflict seeks to prevent unnecessary suffering and
destruction by controlling and mitigating the hannful effects of hostilities
2.(... continued)
Nuremberg stated, "we cannot say that a private citizen shall be placed in the position of being
compelled to detennine in the heat ofwar whether his government is right or wrong, or, ifitstarts
right, when it turns wrong." TIle I.C. Farben Case, 8 TWC 1126,10 LRTWC 39 (1949).
Since armed force can lawfully be used today only in individual or collective self-defense (or as an
enforcement action authorized by the United Nations Security Council in accordance with
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter), the unlawful use of armed force constitutes a crime against
peace under international law . Crimes against peace are defined in art. 6 of the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg and are discussed in paragraph 6.2.5, note 55
(p.343).
The Charter of the International Military Tribunal convened at Nuremberg in 1945 empowered
the Tribunal to try individuals for international crimes, including initiation or waging of a war of
aggression as a crime against peace. This was confirmed as a principle of international law by the
U.N. General Assembly in 1946 (Resolution 95(1» and by the International Law Commission in
1950. In 1974, the U.N. General Assembly adopted by consensus a definition of aggression for use
by the Security Council in detennining if an act of aggression had been committed:
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial
integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition.
Resolution 3314 (XXIX), 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 31, v.l, U.N. Doc. A/9631, at 142 (1974);
Dep't St. Bull., 3 Deb. 1975, at 158-660; AFP 110-20, at 5-78 & 5-79.
This statement is amplified by a sries of examples of uses of armed force which, unless otherwise
justified in international law or detennined by the Security Council not to be ofsufficient gravity,
would pennit the Security Council reasonably to consider to qualify as potential acts ofaggression.
Among these examples are invasion, the use of any weapons by a nation against the territory of
another nation, the imposition of a blockade, an attack by the armed forces of one nation upon the
armed forces of another nation, or the sending of armed bands, irregulars or mercenaries against
another State. (See paragraph 7.7 (p. 390) regarding blockade.) Although neither the International
Military Tribunal judgment nor U.N. General Assembly Resolutions are primary sources of
international law (see Preface, note 4 (p. 3», they are generally consistent with the current U.S.
view of aggression. Dep't St. Bull., 3 Feb. 1975, at 155-58.
3. See paragraph 6.2.5 (war crimes under international law) (p. 343).
4. Joint Pub. 1-02, at 206. The rules governing the actual conduct of armed conflict are
variously known as the jus in bello, the law of armed conflict (law of war), or international
humanitarian law. See paragraph 6.2.2, note 34 (p. 335).
(continued ...)
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4.(... continued)
As a matter ofinternational law, application of the law ofanned conflict between belligerents does
not depend on a declaration or other formal recognition ofthe existence ofa state of"war," but on
whether an "anned conflict" exists, and ifso, whether the anned conflict is ofan "international" or
a "noninternational" character. As a matter of national policy, the Anned Forces of the United
States are required to comply with the law ofanned conflict in the conduct ofmilitary operations
and related activities in anned conflict "however such conflicts are characterized." DOD Directive
5100.77, Subj: DOD LawofWarProgram (in draft as ofl November 1997). See paragraph 5.4.1,
note 15 (p. 298) regarding the Lieber Code and also paragraph 6.1.2 (p. 324).
Although itis frequently difficult to determine when a situation involving violent activity becomes
an "anned conflict," there is general agreement that internal disturbances and tensions are not anned
conflicts. Examples of internal disturbances and tensions include:
- riots (i.e., all disturbances which from the start are not directed by a leader and have
no concetted intent)
- isolated and sporadic acts of violence (as distinct from military operations carried
out by anned forces or organized anned groups)
- other acts of a similar nature (such as mass arrests of persons because of their
behavior or political opinion).
GP II, art. 1(2); ICRC, Commentary on the Draft Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, at 133 (1973), quoted in Bothe, Partsch & Solf628 n.9. The
ICRC Commentary (GP II) (para. 4477, at 1355) distinguishes internal disturbances from internal
tensions. "Internal disturbances" occur when the State uses anned force to maintain order.
"Internal tensions" refers to those circumstances when force is used as a preventive measure to
maintain respect for law and order.
"International" anned conflicts include cases of declared war or any other anned conflict between
two or more nations even if the state ofwar is not recognized by one of them. Common article 2.
All other anned conflicts are "noninternational anned conflicts," governed at least by common
article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and by GP II for nations bound by it if the situation
meets the criteria set forth in art. 1(1) thereof(i.e., there must be an anned conflict occurring in the
territory ofthe nation bound by GP II between its anned forces and dissident anned forces or other
organized anned groups which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of
its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement GP II). The United States interprets GP II as applying to all conflicts covered by
common article 3, and encourages all other nations to do likewise. Letter of Transmittal, Jan. 29,
1987, Senate Treaty Doc. 100-2, at 7. See Annex A5-1 (p. 306). See also International
Humanitarian Law and Non-InternationalAnned Conflicts, 1990 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 383-408;
Levie, The Law of Non-International Anned Conflict (1987). "Anned forces" are discussed in
paragraph 5.3, note 11 (p. 296). See paragraph 5.4.2, note 34 (p. 303) regarding the U.S. decision
not to seek ratification of GP I.
The spectrum of conflict, reflecting the threshhold criteria, is illustrated in Figure A5-1 (p. 314).
Among recent international anned conflicts are the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), the Libya-Chad
War (1987-1988), the China-Vietnam Conflict (1979), and the Soviet-Afghanistan War
(1979-88). Although some have categorized the latter as an internal conflict in which foreign
troops participated, others list it as an international conflict. Reisman & Silk, Which Law Applies
to the Mghan Conflict?, 82 Am.]. Int'l L. 459, 485-86 (1988) (Soviet invasion resisted by loyal
Mghan govemment troops met the criteria of common article 2(1), and was followed by
occupation meeting the criteria ofcommon article 2(2)); Roberts, What is Military Occupation?,
(continued ...)
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through minimum standards of protection to be accorded to "combatants" and
to "noncombatants" and their property.5 (See paragraphs 5.3 and 11.1.) To that
end, the law of armed conflict provides that:
1. Only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of
armed conflict, required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy with
a minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources may be applied. 6
4.(... continued)
55 Brit. Y.B. Ind'l L. 249, 278 (1984) (Soviet occupation may well have met the criteria of
common article 2(2». Certainly the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands War between the United
Kingdom and Argentina (1982) and the Persian Gulf Conflict of 1990-1991 (Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait and the U.N.-authorized coalition response-e.g. OPERATION DESERT STORM)
constituted international armed conflicts. The U.S. has steadfasdy held that the Vietnam War
(1961-1975) was an international armed conflict. U.S. Department of State, The Legality of
United States Participation in the Defense ofViet-Nam, 54 Dep't. of State Bull. 474 (March 28,
1966). For a wide ranging discussion of this issue as it pertains to Vietnam see The Vietnam War
and International Law, Am. Soc. Int'l L., 4 vols. (Falk ed. 1968-76). Among recent
non-international armed conflicts are the Nicaraguan Civil War (1979-90), the ongoing Sri Lanka
Civil War (1983-present), the Chechnya Separatist Conflict (1991-1997), and the Zaire (now
Congo) Civil War (1997).
5. As long as war occurs, the law of armed conflict remains an essential body of international
law. During such strife, the law ofarmed conflict provides common ground ofrationality between
enemies. This body oflaw corresponds to the mutual interests of belligerents during conflict and
constitutes a bridge for a new understanding after the end ofthe conflict. The law ofarmed conflict
is intended to preclude purposeless, unnecessary destruction oflife and property and to ensure that
violence is used only to defeat the enemy's military forces. The law of armed conflict inhibits
warfare from needlessly affecting persons or things of litde military value. By preventing needless
cruelty, the bitterness and hatred arising from armed conflict is lessened, and thus it is easier to
restore an enduring peace. The legal and military experts who attempted to codifY the laws ofwar
more than a hundred years ago reflected this when they declared that the final object of an armed
conflict is the "re-establishment of good relations and a more solid and lasting peace between the
belligerent States." Final Protocol of the Brussels Conference of27 August 1874, Schindler &
Toman 26. See also Green, Why is There-The Law ofWar?, 5 Finn. Y.B. Int'l L. 1994 at 99-148.
6. This concept, often referred to as the principle of "necessity" or "military necessity," is
designed to limit the application ofmilitary force in armed conflict to that which is in fact required
to carry out a lawful military purpose. See Bothe, Partsch & Solfat 194-95. Too often, "military
necessity" is misunderstood and misapplied to support an application of military force that is
unlawful under the misapprehension that the "military necessity" of mission accomplishment
justifies that result. TIle Hostages Case (United States v. List et al.), 11 TWC 1253-54 (1950);
McDougal & Feliciano 523-25; AFP 110-31, at 1-5 & 1-6; FM 27-10, at 3 & 4. See also the
definition of "military necessity" in de Muliner, Handbook on the Law ofWar for Armed Forces
(1987) at Rule 352. In TIle Hostages Case, the Court explained this principle in the follo\vingterrns:
Military necessity has been invoked by the defendants as justifYing the killing of
innocent members of the population and the destruction ofvillages and towns in the
occupied territory. Military necessity pennits a belligerent, subject to the laws of
war, to apply any amount and kind offorce to compel the complete submission of
the enemy with the least possible expenditure of time, life, and money. In general, it
sanctions measures by an occupant necessary to protect the safety ofhis forces and to
facilitate the success of his operations. It pennits the destruction of life of armed
(continued...)
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6.(... continued)
enemies and other persons whose destruction is incidentally unavoidable by the
anned conflicts of the war; it allows the capturing of anned enemies and others of
peculiar danger, but it does not permit the killing of innocent inhabitants for
purposes ofrevenge or the satisfaction ofa lust to kill. The destruction ofproperty to
be lawful must be imperatively demanded by the necessities ofwar. Destruction as an
end in itself is a violation of international law. There must be some reasonable
connection between the destruction of property and the overcoming of the enemy
forces. It is lawful to destroy railways,lines ofcommunication, or any other property
that might be utilized by the enemy. Private homes and churches even may be
destroyed if necessary for military operations. It does not admit the wanton
devastation of a district or the willful infliction of suffering upon its inhabitants for
the sake of suffering alone.
11 TWC 1253-54, quoted in 10 Whiteman 386-87. See also paragraph 6.2.5.5.2 (military necessity)
(p.356).
General Eisenhower recognized this distinction in a message on 29 December 1943 from him as
Allied Commander in the Mediterranean to "all commanders":
Nothing can stand against the argument of military necessity. That is an accepted
principle. But the phrase "military necessity" is sometimes used where it would be
more truthful to speak ofmilitary convenience or even ofpersonal convenience. I do
not want it to cloak slackness or indifference....
Historical Research Center, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, File 622.610-2, Folder 2, 1944-45,

quoted in Schaffer, Wings ofJudgment: American Bombing in World War II, at 50 (1985) and
Hapgood & Richardson, Monte Cassino 158 (1984). See also paragraph 8.5.1.6, note 122 (p. 425).
The principle of military necessity may be, and in many instances is, restricted in its application to
the conduct ofwarfure by other customary or conventional rules, i.e., military necessity is not a
justification which supersedes all other laws of armed conflict. The minority view that all rules of
warfare are subject to, and restricted by, the principle ofmilitary necessity has not been accepted by
the majority ofAmerican and English authorities. Furthennore, this opinion has not been accepted
by military tribunals. Indeed, it has been held by military tribunals that the plea ofmilitary necessity
cannot be considered as a defense for the violation of rules which lay down absolute prohibitions
(e.g., the rule prohibiting the killing ofprisoners ofwar) and which provide no exception for those
circumstances constituting military necessity. Thus, one United States Military Tribunal, in
rejecting the argument that the rules of warfare are always subject to the operation of military
necessity, stated:
It is an essence of war that one or the other side must lose and the experienced
generals and statesmen knew this when they drafted the rules and customs ofland
warfare. In short, these rules and customs of warfare are designed specifically for all
phases ofwar. They comprise the law for such emergency. To claim that they can be
wantonly-and at the sole discretion of anyone belligerent--disregarded when he
considers his own situation to be critical, means nothing more or less than to abrogate
the laws and customs of war entirely.

TIle Kmpp Trial (Trial
LRTWC 139 (1949).

ifAlfred Felix Alwyn Kmpp von Bohlen und Halbadl and Eleven

Others), 10

(continued ...)
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2. The employment of any kind or degree of force not required for the purpose of
the partial or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure of
time, life, and physical resources, is prohibited?
3. Dishonorable (treacherous) means, dishonorable expedients, and dishonorable
8
conduct during armed conflict are forbidden.
6. (... continued)
However, there are rules of customary and conventional law which normally prohibit certain acts,
but which exceptionally allow a belligerent to commit these normally prohibited acts in
circumstances of military necessity. In conventional rules, the precise fonnulation given to this
exception varies. Some rules contain the clause that they shall be observed "as fur as military
necessity (military interests) permits." Examples include GWS, art. 8(3) & GWS-Sea, art. 8(3)
(restricting activities of representatives or delegates of Protecting Powers); GWS, art. 33(2),
GWS-Sea, art. 28 (use of captured medical supplies); GWS, art. 32(2) (return of neutral persons);
GWS, art. 30(1) (return of captured medical and religious personnel); GC, arts. 16(2) (facilitating
search for wounded and sick), 55(3) (limiting verification ofstate of food and medical supplies in
occupied territories), 108(2) (limitations on relief shipments); GWS, art. 42(4), GPW, art. 23(4)
and GC, art. 18(4) (visibility of distinctive emblems). Other rules permit acts normally forbidden,
if "required" or "demanded" by the necessities of war. Examples include HR, art. 23(g), GWS,
art. 34(2) & GC, art. 53 (permitting destruction or seizure ofproperty); GPW, art. 126(2) & GC,
art. 143(3) (limiting visits of representatives and delegates of Protecting Powers); GC, arts. 49(2)
(evacuation of protected persons from occupied territory), 49(5) (detention of protected persons
in areas exposed to dangers of war). Rules providing for the exceptional operation of military
necessity require a careful consideration of the relevant circumstances to determine whether or not
the application of otherwise excessive force is rendered necessary in order to protect the safety ofa
belligerent's forces or to facilitate the success ofits military operations. 10 Whiteman 302 (citing
NWIP 10-2, sec. 220(b». See also paragraph 6.2.3 (p. 335) regarding reprisals.
7. See FM 27-10, at 3; AFP 110-31, at 1-6. This principle, directed against infliction of
unnecessary suffering or superflous injury, is referred to as the "principle ofproportionality" or the
"principle of humanity." The opinion is occasionally expressed that the principles of necessity and
proportionality contradict each other in the sense that they serve opposing ends. This is not the
case. The principle of necessity allows the use of sufficient force to accomplish a lawful purpose
during anned conflict. It complements the principle of proportionality which disallows any kind
or degree of force not essential for the realization of that lawful purpose. Together, the principles
of necessity and proportionality make unlawful any use of force which needlessly or unnecessarily
causes or aggravates human suffering or physical destruction. The real difficulty arises not from the
actual meaning of the principles, but from their application in practice. 10 Whiteman 302 (citing
NWIP 10-2, sec. 220 n.9). The rule ofproportionality has been arriculated in GP I, arts. 51 (5) (b)
and 57(2)(a)(iii), as prohibiting attacks
[W]hich may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

See Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 Mil. Law
Rev. 1982 at 91. The tenn "concrete and direct", as used in arts. 51 and 57, refers to "the
advantage anticipated from the specific military operation of which the attack is a part taken as a
whole and not from isolated or particular parts of the operation." Bothe, Partsch & Solf311. See
also Solf, Protection of Civilians 128-35; paragraph 8.1.2.1 and notes 16-20 thereunder (incidental
injury and collateral damage) (p. 404).
8. See Chapter 12 and Bothe, Partsch & Solf at 201-207 regarding prohibited deceptions or
perfidy.
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The law of armed conflict is not intended to impede the waging of hostilities.
Its purpose is to ensure that the violence of hostilities is directed toward the
enemy's forces and is not used to cause purposeless, unnecessary human misery
and physical destruction. In that sense, the law of armed conflict complements
and supports the principles of warfare embodied in the military concepts of
objective, mass, economy of force, surprise, and security. Together, the law of
armed conflict and the principles of warfare underscore the importance of
concentrating forces against critical military targets while avoiding the
expenditure of personnel and resources against persons, places, and things that
are militarily unimportant. 9 However, these principles do not prohibit the
9. Although the U.S. Navy has not adopted as doctrine the Principles of War, useful
discussions of their application in naval tactics may be found in Hughes, Fleet Tactics 140-45 &
290-97 (1986); Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy 108-13 (1965); and Brown, The
Principles of War, U.S. Naval Inst. Proc., June 1949, at 621. The Marine Corps, Anny and Air
Force have adopted variations of the principles of war as service doctrine: U.S. Marine Corps,
Marine Rifle Company/Platoon, FMFM 6-4, para. 1403 (1978); U.S. Air Force, Basic Aerospace
Doctrine, AFM 1-1, March 1992, vol. II at 9-15; Department of the Anny, Operations, FM
100-5, at 2-4 to 2-5 (1993); Anned Forces Staff College, Joint Staff Officer's Guide, Pub 1, para.
101, at p. 1-3 (1993); Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995 at 11-1. The
principles of war in any case are not a set of inflexible rules; rather they are "good tools to sharpen
the mind," and are essential elements in successful military operations. Eccles 113.
The principle of tire objedive provides that every military undertaking must have an objective, that
is, it must be directed toward a clearly defined goal and all activity must contribute to the
attainment of that goal. Military objectives necessarily support national objectives-in peace as
well as in war--and, more directly, support the national war aims during conflict. The law of
armed conflict supports this principle by assisting in defining what is politically and legally
obtainable.
The principle ofconcentration or mass states that to achieve success in war it is essential to concentrate
superior forces at the decisive place and time in the proper direction, and to sustain this superiority
at the point of contact as long as it may be required. With the law of armed conflict, this principle
serves, in part, to employ the proper economy of force at or in the decisive points and to enable
maximum total effective force to be exerted in achieving the objective.

Economy offorce means that no more-or less-effortshould be devoted to a task than is necessary to
achieve the objective. This implies the correct selection and use ofweapons and weapon systems,
maximum productivity from available weapons platforms, and careful balance in the allocation of
tasks. This principle is consistent with the fundamental legal principle of proportionality.
Surprise results from creating unexpected situations or from taking courses of least probable
expectation-both considered from the enemy point of view and both designed to exploit the
enemy's consequent lack of preparedness. It permits the attaining of maximum effect from a
minimum expenditure ofeffort. The lawfulness ofsuch techniques as deception supports surprise.
Security embraces all measures which must be taken to guard against any form of counter-stroke
which the enemy may employ to prevent the attainment of the objective or to obtain its own
objective. Security implies the gaining of enemy intelligence. Surveillance and spying are not
prohibited by intemationallaw including the law of armed conflict.
(continued ...)
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application of overwhehning force against enemy combatants, units and
material.

5.3 COMBATANTS AND NONCOMBATANTS
The law of armed conflict is based largely on the distinction to be made
between combatants and noncombatants. In accordance with this distinction,
the population of a nation engaged in armed conflict is divided into two general
classes: armed forces (combatants) and the civilian populace (noncombatants).
Each class has specific rights and obligations in time of armed conflict, and no
single individual can be simultaneously a combatant and a noncombatant. 10
The term "combatant" embraces those persons who have the right under
international law to participate directly in armed conflict during hostilities.
Combatants, therefore, include all members of the regularly organized armed
forces ofa party to the conflict (except medical personnel, chaplains, civil defense
personnel, and members of the armed forces who have acquired civil defense
status), as well as irregular forces who are under responsible command and
subject to internal military discipline, carry their arms openly, and otherwise
11
distinguish themselves clearly from the civilian population.
9.( ... continued}
Other principles of war are: unity oj command which ensures that all efforts are focused on a
common goal or objective; maneuverwhlch seeks to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage
through the flexible application of combat power; and qffensive which, contemplates seizing,
retaining and exploiting the initiative.
10. 10 Whiteman 135 (citing NWIP 10-2, para. 221a). Chapter 11 discusses noncombatants in
detail. See HR, art. 3(2}; GP I, art. 43(2}.
11. The "armed forces" of a Party to an armed conflict include all organized armed forces,
groups and units which are under a command responsible to that Party for the conduct of its
subordinates, even if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not recognized by
an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter
alia, shall enforce compliance with the rules ofinternational law applicable in armed conflict. GP I,
art. 43(1}. Other requirements for combatant status are discussed in paragraph 11.7 (p. 489),
especially notes 52 & 53 and accompanying text. See also de Preux, Synopsis VII: Combatant and
prisoner-of-war status, 1989 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 43.
Persons acting on their own in fighting a private war, including gangs of terrorists acting on their
own behalf and not linked to an entity subject to international law, are not lawful combatants. See
paragraph 12.7.1 (p. 515), and Baxter, So-Called Unprivileged Belligerency: Spies, Guerrillas and
Saboteurs, 28 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 323 (1951), regarding illegal combatants.
On identification of combatants and noncombatants, see de Preux, Synopsis IV:
Identification-Fundamental Principle, 1985 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 364. For a discussion of the
obligation of members of an irregular force to carry their arms openly and otherwise distinguish
themselves from the civilian population, see paragraph 11.7 and note 53 thereunder (p. 491). On
respect for persons protected by the Geneva Conventions, see Green, Contemporary Law of
Armed Conflict, 1993, chaps. 10 & 11; de Preux, Synopsis IX: Respect for the Human Being in
the Geneva Conventions, 1989 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 217.
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Conversely, the term "noncombatant" is primarily applied to those
individuals who do not form a part ofthe armed forces and who otherwise refrain
from the commission or direct support of hostile acts. In this context,
noncombatants and, generally, the civilian population, are synonymous. The
term noncombatants may, however, also embrace certain categories of persons
who, although members of or accompanying the armed forces, enjoy special
protected status, such as medical officers, corpsmen, chaplains, technical (i.e.,
contractor) representatives, and civilian war correspondents. (See Chapter 11.)
The term is also applied to armed forces personnel who are unable to engage in
combat because of wounds, sickness, shipwreck, or capture. 12
Under the law of armed conflict, noncombatants must be safeguarded against
injury not incidental to military operations directed against combatant forces and
other military objectives. In particular, it is forbidden to make noncombatants
the object of attack. 13
Because only combatants may lawfully participate directly in armed combat,
noncombatants that do so are acting unlawfully and are considered illegal
combatants. See paragraphs 11.5 (Medical Personnel and Chaplains) and 12.7.1
(illegal Combatants).

5.4 SOURCES OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT

As is the case with international law generally, the principal sources of the law
of armed conflict are custom, as reflected in the practice of nations, and
.
. al agreements. 14
mternatlon
5.4.1 Customary Law. The customary international law of armed conflict
derives from the practice ofmilitary and naval forces in the field, at sea, and in the
air during hostilities. When such a practice attains a degree of regularity and is
accompanied by the general conviction among nations that behayior in
conformity with that practice is obligatory, it can be said to have become a rule of
customary law binding upon all nations. It is frequently difficult to determine the
12. 10 Whiteman 135, dting NWIP 10-2, para. 221a n.12; Kalshoven, Noncombatant
Persons, in Robertson, at 304-24; Green, note 11, at chap. 12. See paragraph 11.1 (p. 481).
13. 10 Whiteman 135, dting NWIP 10-2. para. 221b; Kalshoven, Noncombatant Persons, in
Robertson, at 306-07. See paragraph 11.2 (protected status) (p. 481). For a discussion ofGP I arts.
48 & 51, see Bothe, Partsch & Solf at 280-86 & 296-318.
14. See Prefuce (p. 3). Evidence of the law of armed conflict may also be found in national
military manuals,judicial decisions, the writings ofpublicists, and the work ofvarious international
bodies. Documents on the Laws ofWar 6-9 (Roberts & GueIff eds., 2d ed. 1989). With regard to
the importance of national military manuals as evidence of the law of armed conflict, see Reisman
& Lietzau, Moving International Law from Theory to Practice: the Role of Military Manuals in
Effectuating the Law of Armed Conflict, in Robertson, at 7-9; Green, paragraph 5.3, note 11
(p. 296), at chap. 2. For a listing of military manuals see Fleck at app. 3.
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precise point in time at which a usage or practice of warfare evolves into a
customary rule oflaw. In a period marked by rapid developments in technology,
coupled with the broadening of the spectrum of conflict to encompass
insurgencies and state-sponsored terrorism, it is not surprising that nations often
disagree as to the precise content of an accepted practice of armed conflict and to
its status as a rule oflaw. This lack of precision in the definition and interpretation
of rules of customary law has been a principal motivation behind efforts to codify
the law of armed conflict through written agreements (treaties and
conventions.) 15 However, the inherent flexibility oflaw built on custom and the
15. The roots of the present law of armed conflict may be traced back to practices of
belligerents which arose, and grew gradually, during the latter part of the Middle Ages, primarily as
a result of the influences of Christianity and chivalry. See Draper, The Interaction of Christianity
and Chivalry in the Historical Development of the Law of War, 1965, 5 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 3;
Meron, Henry's Wars and Shakespeare's Laws (1993); Meron, Shakespeare's Henry the Fifth and
the Law of War, 86 Am.]. Int'l L. 1 (1992); The Laws of War: Constraints on Warfare in the
Western World (Howard, Andreopoulus & Shulman eds. 1994) at 27-39. Unlike the savage
cruelty of former times, belligerents gradually adopted the view that the realization of the
objectives ofwar was in no way limited by consideration shown to the wounded, to prisoners, and
to private individuals who did not take part in the fighting. Progress continued during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Hugo Grotius codified the first rules ofwarfare in his DeJure
Belli ac Pads in 1642. These rules were widely adopted by nations, partly for ethical reasons, and
partly because the remnants of chivalry were still influential among aristocratic officers.
The most important developments in the laws of armed conflict took place in the period after
1850. The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars first introduced the concept of the citizen
army. While during the 17th and 18th centuries the means of destruction were limited by the
absence of industrial might and combatants were limited to a small group of professional soldiers,
the distinction between combatants and noncombatants became blurred as armed forces began to
rely upon the direct support of those who remained at home. Limitations on the means of
destruction were also in transition, as by the middle of the 19th century the effect of the industrial
revolution was beginning to be felt on the batdefield. A combination ofthe increased killing power
ofartillery, the inadequacy offield medical treatment and the outmoded infantry tactics resulted in
unprecedented batdefield losses. The public reaction to the particularly harsh experiences of the
Crimean War (1854-56) and the United States' Civil War, renewed the impetus for the imposition
of limits on war and demonstrated the need for mOT, precise written rules of the law of armed
conflict to replace the vague customary rules. The horrors of the Batde ofSolferino in northern
Italy in 1859 resulted in the formation of the Red Cross movement in 1863. Dunant, The Battle of
Solferino (1861). (See paragraph 6.2.2 (p. 334) for a description of the ICRC and its activities.) It
was in this light that the first conventions to aid the sick and wounded were concluded at Geneva in
1864. (See Pictet, The First Geneva Convention, 1989 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 277.) In the United
States, President Lincoln commissioned Dr. Francis Lieber, then a professor at Columbia College,
New York City, to draft a code for the use of the Union Army during the Civil War. His code was
revised by a board ofArmy officers, and promulgated by President Lincoln as General Orders No.
100, on 24 April 1863, as the Instructions for the Government ofArrnies ofthe United States in the
Field. (See Baxter, The First Modem Codification of the Law ofWar, 3 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 1963
at 171; Solf, Protection of Civilians 121; Hoffinan, The Customary Law of Non-International
Armed Conflict: Evidence from the United States Civil War, 1990 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 322.) The
(continued ...)
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fact that it reflects the actual-albeit constandy evolving-practice of nations,
underscore the continuing importance of customary international law in the
development of the law of armed conflict. 16
5.4.2 International Agreements. International agreements, whether
denominated as treaties, conventions, or protocols, have played a major role in
the development of the law of armed conflict. Whether codifying existing rules
of customary law or creating new rules to govern future practice, international
agreements are a source of the law of armed conflict. Rules oflaw established
through international agreements are ordinarily binding only upon those nations
that have ratified or adhered to them. Moreover, rules established through the
treaty process are binding only to the extent required by the terms of the treaty
itself as limited by the reservations, if any, that have accompanied its ratification
15.(...continued)
Lieber Code strongly influenced the further codification of the law of anned conflict and the
adoption of similar regulations by many nations, including the Oxford Manual of 1880;
Declaration ofBrussels of1874; and the United States Naval War Code of1900, and had a great
influence on the drafters of Hague Convention No. II (1899), replaced by Hague Convention IV
(1907) regarding the Laws and Customs ofWar on Land. The 1907 Hague Regulations annexed to
Hague IV have been supplemented by the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to Protection of
Civilians in Time ofWar, the 1949 Convention Relative to the Treatment ofPrisoners ofWar, the
1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the 1980 Conventional
Weapons Convention, as amended. The principles ofcustomary international law codified in such
treaties are identified in the relevant notes to the text.
In the past halfcentury there has been a marked tendency to include among the sources ofthe rules
of warfare certain principles of law adopted by many nations in their domestic legislation. The
Statute of the International Court ofJustice includes within the sources ofinternational law which
it shall apply, "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." Statute of the I.CJ.,
art. 38, para. 1.c. In the judgment rendered in TIle Hostages Case, the United States Military
Tribunal stated:
The tendency has been to apply the tenn "customs and practices accepted by
civilized nations generally, as it is used in international law, to the laws of war only.
But the principle has no such restricted meaning. It applies as well to fundamental
principles of justice which have been accepted and adopted by civilized nations
generally. In detennining whether such a fundamental rule ofjustice is entitled to be
declared a principle of international law, an examination of the municipal laws of
states in the family of nations will reveal the answer. If it is found to have been
accepted generally as a fundamental rule ofjustice by most nations in their municipal
law, its declaration as a rule ofinternationallaw would seem to be fully justified.

United States v. List et ai., 11 TWC 1235 (1950).
16. The role ofcustomary international law in developing the law ofanned conflict is cogently
discussed in the introduction to Documents on the Law of War, note 14 (p. 297), at 4-6. See
Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (1989) and Meron, The
Geneva Conventions As Customary Law, 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 348 (1987). See also Bruderlein,
Custom in International Humanitarian Law, 1991 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 579.
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or adherence by individual nations.17 Conversely, to the extent that such rules
codify existing customary law or otherwise come, over time, to represent a
general consensus among nations of their obligatory nature, they are binding
.
alike. 18
upon party an d non-party natlons
Principal among the international agreements reflecting the development and
codification of the law of armed conflict are the Hague Regulations of1907, the
17. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 21, reprinted in 8 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 679
(1969). Numerous multilateral agreements contain a provision similar to that contained in article
28 of Hague Convention No. XIII (1907) that "The provisions of the present Convention do not
apply except between the Contracting Powers, and only if all the belligerents are parties to the
Convention." The effects of this so called "general participation" clause have not been as
far-reaching as might be supposed. In World Wars I and II and the Korean War, belligerents
frequently affirmed their intention to be bound by agreements containing the general participation
clause regardless of whether or not the strict requirements of the clause were actually met. In
practice, prize courts during and after WW I disregarded the nonparticipation of non-naval
belligerents. 17le Blood [1922] 1 A.C. 313.
18. Certain conventions have been generally regarded either as a codification of pre -existing
customary law or as having come to represent, through widespread observance, rules of law
binding upon all States. Both the International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and for the Far
East treated the general participation clause in Hague Convention No. IV (1907), Respecting the
Laws and Customs ofWar on Land, as irrelevant. They also declared that the general principles laid
down in the 1929 Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar, which does
not contain a general participation clause, were binding on signatories and nonsignatories alike.
Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment 83, u.S. Naval War College, International
Law Documents 1946-1947, at 281-82 (1948); IMTFE,Judgment 28, u.S. Naval War College,
International Law Documents 1948-49, at 81 (1950). Art. 2, para. 3, of all four 1949 Geneva
Conventions states:
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present
Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall remain bound by it in their
mutual relations. They shall furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to
the said Power, if the latter accepts and applies the provisions thereo£
Similar provisions are contained in art. 96 of GP I and art. 7 of the 1980 Conventional Weapons
Convention, as amended.
This subject is explored in detail in Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 Am.

J. Int'l L. 348 (1987); Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (1989).
Cf Solf, Protection of Civilians 124, text accompanying nn. 39-41.
For efforts to identifY those provisions of GP I which codifY existing international law, see Penna,
Customary International Law and Protocol I: An Analysis of Some Provisions, in Studies and
Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour ofJean Pictet 201
(Swinarski ed. 1984); Cassese, The Geneva Protocols of1977 on the Humanitarian Law ofArmed
Conflict and Customary International Law, 3 UCLA Pac. Bas. LJ. 55-118 (1984) (GP I and II);
The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College ofLaw Conference on International
Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. UJ. Int'l L. & Policy 422-28 (1987) (remarks
of U.S. Department of State Deputy Legal Adviser Matheson); Hogue, IdentifYing Customary
International Law ofWarin Protocol I: A Proposed Restatement, 13 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Compo LJ.
279 (1990).
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Gas Protocol of 1925, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of
War Victims, the 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention, the Biological
Weapons Convention of1972, and the Conventional Weapons Convention of
1980. Whereas the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Protocols
Additional thereto address, for the most part, the protection of victims of war,
the Hague Regulations, the Geneva Gas Protocol, 1993 Chemical Weapons
Convention, Hague Cultural Property Convention, Biological Weapons
Convention, and the Conventional Weapons Convention are concerned,
primarily, with controlling the means and methods of warfare. 19 The most
significant of these agreements (for purposes of this publication) are listed
chronologically as follows:
1. 1907 HifIe Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land
(Hague IV)
2. 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague V)21
19. The major treaties on naval warfare presently in force date back to 1907, before the large
scale use ofsubmarines and aircraft in naval operations. The 1936 London Protocol on submarine
warfare resulted from attempts by traditionalists to require submarines, which at that time generally
attacked while on the surface, to adhere to rules governing methods ofattack applicable to surface
combatants. See Levie, Submarine Warfare: With Emphasis on the 1936 London Protocol, in
Grunawalt at 41-48. The GWS-Sea, as supplemented by portions of GP I, develops only the rules
on the protection of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea. In large measure, the law of naval
warfare continues to develop in its traditional manner through the practice ofnations ripening into
customary (as opposed to treaty) law. A series of meetings of experts, sponsored by the
International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo, Italy commencing in 1987, led to the San
Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea,June 1994. The Manual
and accompanying explanation of its provisions may be found in San Remo Manual on
International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, Prepared by International Lawyers and
Naval ExpertS Convened by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law (Doswald-Beck ed.
1995). See Robertson, An International Manual for the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, Duke L.
Mag., Winter 1995, at 14-18.
':I:he military F.•.m:..::!:; o:! n'1::'11 warfare ,,,'!re, until recently, antiquated. See U.S. Navy, Law of
Naval Warfare, NWIP 10-2 (195~) (set vut in its entirety in the appendix to Tucker), which was
repJaLed by the Commander's Handbook on the Law ofNaval Operations, NWP 9 (1987), NWP
9 ReVlSllJ"l A/FMFM 1-10 (1989) (set out in its entirety in the Appendix to Robertson) and this
presentIru n.lal. See also chaps. 8-11 of the Royal Australian Navy, Manual of the Law of the Sea,
ABR 5179 (1~113). New manuals on the law of naval warfare have been recently promulgated or
are in preparation by a number of other nations, including the United Kingdom, Canada,
Germany, Japan, Italy. ::or!. Russia.
20. The general prinCIples of Hague IV reflect customary international law. See cases cited in
note 18 (p. 300), and Solf, Protection of Civilians 123 text at n.41. Hague IV is discussed in
Chapters 8, 9, 11 & 12 passim. But see Lowe, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations and the Contemporary Law of the Sea, in Robertson, at 130.
21. Hague V is discussed in Chapter 7 (The Law of Neutrality).
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3. 1907 Hague Convention Relative to the Laying of Automatic Submarine
Contact Mines (Hague VIII)22
4. 1907 Hague Convention Concerning Bombardment by Naval Forces in
Time of War (Hague IX)23
5. 1907 Hague Convention Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to the
Exercise of the Right of Capture in Naval War (Hague XI)24
6. 1907 Hague Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers in Naval War (Hague XIII)25

7. 1925 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asph:trating,
Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare 6
8. 1936 London Protocol in Regard to the Operations of Submarines or Other
War Vessels with Respect to Merchant Vessels (part IV of the 1930 London Naval
27
Treaty)
9. 1949 Geneva Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
28
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Fiell
10. 1949 Geneva Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea*29
11. 1949 Geneva Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
*30
War
22. Hague VIII is discussed in paragraphs 9.2 (naval mines) (p. 441) and 9.4 (torpedoes)
(p.9-14).
23. Hague IX is discussed in paragraphs 8.5 (bombardment) (p. 422) and 11.9.3 (Hague
symbol) (p. 498).
24. Hague XI is mentioned in paragraph 8.2.3, notes 72, 74, & 78 (pp. 417 and 418).
25. Hague XIII is discussed in Chapter 7.
26. The 1925 Geneva Gas Protocol is discussed in paragraph 10.3 (chemical weapons) (p.466).
27. The 1936 London Protocol is discussed in paragraphs 8.2.2.2 (destruction of enemy
merchant vessels) (p. 410) and 8.3.1 (submarine warfare) (p. 419).
28. The 1949 Geneva Wounded and Sick Convention is discussed in paragraph 11.4
(wounded, sick and shipwrecked) (p. 484). See Table A5-1 (p. 315) for a listing of the nations that
are party to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, I, II, III and IV.
29. The 1949 Geneva Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Convention is discussed in paragraph
11.4 (wounded, sick and shipwrecked) (p. 484).
30. The general principles (but not the details) of the 1929 Geneva Prisoners of War
Convention, which are repeated in the 1949 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention, have been
held to be declaratory of customary intemationallaw. See note 18 (p. 300); FM 27-10, para. 6. The
1949 Geneva Prisoners of War Convention is discussed in paragraph 11.7 (prisoners of war)
(p.489).
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12. 1949 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons

. T·nne 0 fWar*31
In
13. 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the event
32
of anned conflict
14. 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their
. 33
D estructlon
15. 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Relating
to the Protection ofVictims ofIntemational Armed Conflict (Additional Protocol
I) *34
31. The 1949 Geneva Civilians Convention is discussed in paragraph 11.8 (interned persons)
(p.495).
32. The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Convention and the 1935 Roerich Pact are discussed
in paragraph 11.9.2 (other protective symbols) (p. 497).
33. The 1972 Biological Weapons Convention is discussed in paragraph lOA (biological
weapons) (p. 477).
34. The President decided not to submit GP I to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification. 23 Weekly Compo Pres. Doc. 91 (29 Jan. 1987), 81 Am.]. Int'l L. 910. France
(Schindler & Toman 709) and Israel have also indicated their intention not to ratifY GP 1. The U.S.
position on GP I is set forth in Senate Treaty Doc. No. 100-2, reprinted in 26 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 561
(1987) and Annex AS-l (p. 306). Other sources opposing U.S. ratification include Roberts, The
New Rules for Waging War: The Case Against Ratification ofAdditional Protocol I, 26 Va.]. Int'l
L. 109 (1985); Feith, Law in the Service of Terror-The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol,
1 The National Interest, Fall 1985, at 36; Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 Foreign Affairs,
Summer 1986, at 901; Feith, Moving Humanitarian Law Backwards, 19 Akron L. Rev. 531
(1986); The Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on
International Humanitarian Law: A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977
Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 2 Am. U J. Int'l L. & Policy 460 (1987)
(remarks of U.S. Department ofState Legal Adviser Sofaer); Sofaer, The Rationale for the United
States Decision, 82 Am.]. Int'l L. 784 (1988); Parks, Air War and the Law ofWar, 32 A.F.L. Rev.
1,89-225 (1990). Contra, Aldrich, Progressive Development of the Law of War: A Reply to
Criticisms of the 1977 Geneva ProtocolI, 26 Va.]. Int'l L. 693 (1986); Solf, Protection ofCivilians
Against the Effects ofHostilities Under Customary International Law and Under Protocol I, 1 Am.
Univ.]. Int'l L. & Policy 117 (1986); Solf, A Response to Douglas]. Feith's Law in the Service of
Terror-The Strange Case of the Additional Protocol, 20 Akron L. Rev. 261 (1986); Gasser,
Prohibition of Terrorist Acts in International Humanitarian Law, 26 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 200,
210-212 (Jul.-Aug. 1986); Gasser, An Appeal for Ratification by the United States, 81 Am.]. Int'l
L. 912 (1987); Gasser, Letter to the Editor in Chief, 83 Am.]. Int'l L. 345 (1989); Bagley, 11 Loy.
L.A. Int'l & Compo LJ. 439 (1989); Aldrich, Prospects for United States Ratification ofAdditional
Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 85 Am.]. Int'l L. 1 (1991). See also Levie, The 1977
Protocoll and the United States, 38 St. Louis U. Law]. 469 (1994), reprinted in Schmitt & Green at
chap. XVII.

As of15 October 1997,147 nations were party to GP I, including NATO members Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway and
(continued...)
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16. 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Relating
to the Protection ofVictirns of Non-International Anned Conflicts (Additional
*35
Protocol II)
17. 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to
..
Effcects*36
h ave I n di scrumnate
34.(... continued)
Spain; the Republic of Korea; Australia; New Zealand; Russia and the fonner Warsaw Pact
nations; Austria, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland (each of which has proclaimed itselfas neutral
under the doctrine of pennanent neutrality); as well as China, Cuba, DPRK and Libya. GP I is in
force as between those nations party to it. See the complete listing at Table A5-1 (p. 315).
The travaux preparatoires ofGP I are organized by article and published in Levie, Protection ofWar
Victims: Protocoll to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (4 vols. 1979-81 and Supp.). See also Bothe,
Partsch & Solfat 1-603, and ICRC, Commentary (GP I) 19-1304.
It is important that U.S. military operational lawyers are aware that U.S. coalition partners in a
future conflict will likely be party to GP I and bound by its terms. See also Matheson, note 18
(p. 300) and Annex A5-1 (final paragraph ofp. 308).
35. The President submitted GP II to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on 29
January 1987. Sen. Treaty Doc. 100-2,23 Weekly Compo Pres. Doc. 91; 26 Int'lLeg. Mat'ls 561
(1987), Annex A5-1 (p. 306). The proposed statements ofunderstanding and reservations to GP II
are analyzed in Smith, New Protections for Victims ofInternational [sic] Anned Conflicts: The
Proposed Ratification of Protocol II by the United States, 120 Mil. L. Rev. 59 (1988).
36. The 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention, reprinted in 19 Int'l Leg. Mat'ls 1524
(1980); AFP 110-20 at 3-177, is discussed in paragraphs 9.1.1 (undetectable fragments) (p. 438),
9.3 (land mines) (p. 448), 9.6 (booby traps and other delayed action devices) (p. 451), 9.7
(incendiary weapons) (p. 452) and 9.8 (directed energy devices) (p. 452). The Convention
originally included three separate protocols, e.g., Protocol on Non-Detectable Fragements
(Protocol I); Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and
Other Devices (Protocol II); and Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Incendiary Weapons (protocol III). The United States became party to the Convention and
Protocols I and II on 24 September 1995, but declined to ratify Protocol III at that time. At the First
Review Conference (September 1995-May 1996), Protocol II was substantially amended and a
new Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocol IV) was adopted. On 5 January 1997,
President Clinton submitted the amended Protocol II, the original Protocol III (with a
reservation), and new Protocol IV to the Senate for its advice and consent to their ratification. See
notes 36, 44 & 45 accompanying paragraphs 9.3 (land mines) (p. 448), 9.7 (incendiary weapons)
(p. 452) and 9.8 (directed energy devices) (p. 453). See also Nash, Contemporary Practice of the
United States Relating to International Law, 91 Am.]. Int'l L. 325 (1997). As of15 October1997,
71 nations, including the U.S., u.K., Germany, Italy, Denmark, France, Netherlands, Norway,
Australia,Japan, China, Russia and other ex-Warsaw Pact nations, and the neutral nations, have
ratified the Conventional Weapons Convention (and two or more of its four protocols), and it is in
force as between those nations with respect to commonly ratified protocols. (For a current listing
of parties to the Convention and its Protocols see www.icrc.ch/icrcnews).
The travaux preparatoires of the "umbrella" treaty and Protocol I (non-detectable fragments) are set
forth in Roach, Certain Conventional Weapons Convention: Arms Control or Humanitarian
Law?, 105 Mil. L. Rev. 1; of Protocol II (land mines) in Carnahan, The Law of Land Mine
Warfare: Protocol II to the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, id. at
(continued ...)
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18. 1993 Convention on the Prohibition of Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction?7
An asterisk (*) indicates that signature or ratification of the United States was
subject to one or more reservations or understandings. The United States is a
party to, and bound by, all of the foregoing conventions and protocols, except
numbers 13, 15, 16 and 18. The United States has decided not to ratify number
15 (Additional Protocol 1).38 The United States has ratified number 17,
Protocols I and II, but has not ratified Protocol III.

5.5 RULES OF ENGAGEMENT39
During wartime or other periods of armed conflict, U.S. rules of engagement
reaffirm the right and responsibility of the operational commander generally to
seek out, engage, and destroy enemy forces consistent with national objectives,
strategy, and the law of armed conflict.40

36.(... continued)
73; and of Protocol III (incendiary weapons) in Parks, The Protocol on Incendiary Weapons, 30
Int'l Rev. Red Cross 535 (Nov.-Dec. 1990). See also Fenrick, The Law of Anned Conflict: The
CUSHIE Weapons Treaty, 11 Can. DeE Q., Sununer 1981, at 25; Fenrick, New Developments
in the Law Concerning the Use ofConventionaI Weapons in Anned Conflict, 19 Can. Y.B. Int'l
L. 229 (1981); Schmidt, The Conventional Weapons Convention: Implication for the American
Soldier, 24 A.F.L. Rev. 279 (1984); Rogers, A Conunentary on the Protocol on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices, 26 Mil. L. & L. of War Rev.
185 (1987); and Symposium, Tenth Anniversary of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or
Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, 30 Int'l Rev. Red Cross 469-577
(Nov.-Dec. 1990).
37. The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention has since been ratified by the U.S. (24 April
1997). The Convention is discussed in paragraph 10.3.1.2 (p. 10-13).
38. Six ofthe 1907 Hague Conventions entered into force for the U.S. in 1909, while the four
Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 entered into force for the United States in 1956. The
Administration is reconsidering whether to submit the 1954 Hague Cultural Property
Convention to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
39. See Preface and paragraph 4.3.2.2 (p. 263).
40. Accordingly, wartime rules of engagement may include restrictions on weapons and
targets, and provide guidelines to ensure the greatest possible protection for noncombatants
consistent with military necessity. Roach, Rules ofEngagement, Nav. War Coll. Rev.,Jan.-Feb.
1983, at 49; Phillips, ROE: A Primer, Anny Lawyer, July 1993 at 21-23; GrunawaIt, The JCS
Standing Rules ofEngagement: AJudgeAdvocate's Primer, 42 Air Force Law Rev. 245 (1997).
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ANNEX AS-l
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL AND LETTER OF SUBMITTAL
RELATING TO PROTOCOL II ADDITIONAL TO THE GENEVA
CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949.
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

The White House,January 29, 1987.

To the Senate if the United States
I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification,
Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
concluded at Geneva onJune 10, 1977. I also enclose for the information of the
Senate the report of the Department of State on the Protocol.
The United States has traditionally been in the forefront of efforts to codify
and improve the international rules of humanitarian law in armed conflict, with
the objective of giving the greatest possible protection to victims of such
conflicts, consistent with legitimate military requirements. The agreement that I
am transmitting today is, with certain exceptions, a positive step toward this goal.
Its ratification by the United States will assist us in continuing to exercise
leadership in the international community in these matters.
The Protocol is described in detail in the attached report of the Department of
State. Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions is essentially an expansion of
the fundamental humanitarian provisions contained in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions with respect to non-international armed conflicts, including
humane treatment and basic due process for detained persons, protection of the
wounded, sick and medical units, and protection of noncombatants from attack
and deliberate starvation. If these fundamental rules were observed, many of the
worst human tragedies of current internal armed conflicts could be avoided. In
particular, among other things, the mass murder of civilians is made illegal, even
if such killings would not amount to genocide because they lacked racial or
religious motives. Several Senators asked me to keep this objective in mind when
adopting the Genocide Convention. I remember my commitment to them.
This Protocol makes clear that any deliberate killing of a noncombatant in the
course ofa non-international armed conflict is a violation of the laws ofwar and a
crime against humanity, and is therefore also punishable as murder.
While I recommend that the Senate grant advice and consent to this
agreement, I have at the same time concluded that the United States cannot ratify
a second agreement on the law of armed conflict negotiated during the same
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period. I am referring to Protocol I additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
which would revise the rules applicable to international armed conflicts. Like all
other efforts associated with the International Committee of the Red Cross, this
agreement has certain meritorious elements. But Protocol I is fundamentally and
irreconcilably flawed. It contains provisions that would undermine
humanitarian law and endanger civilians in war. One of its provisions, f<;>r
example, would automatically treat as an international conflict any so-called
"war of national liberation." Whether such wars are international or
non-international should tum exclusively on objective reality, not on one's view
of the moral qualities of each conflict. To rest on such subjective distinctions
based on a war's alleged purposes would politicize humanitarian law and
eliminate the distinction between international and non-international conflicts.
It would give special status to "wars of national liberation," an ill-defined
concept expressed in vague, subjective, politicized terminology. Another
provision would grant combatant status to irregular forces even if they do not
satisfy the traditional requirements to distinguish themselves from the civilian
population and otherwise comply with the laws of war. This would endanger
civilians among whom terrorists and other irregulars attempt to conceal
themselves. These problems are so fundamental in character that they cannot be
remedied through reservations, and I therefore have decided not to submit the
Protocol to the Senate in any form, and I would invite an expression of the sense
of the Senate that it shares this view. Finally, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have also
concluded that a number of the provisions of the Protocol are militarily
unacceptable.
It is unfortunate that Protocol I must be rejected. We would have preferred to
ratify such a convention, which as I said contains certain sound elements. But we
cannot allow other nations of the world, however numerous, to impose upon us
and our allies and friends an unacceptable and thoroughly distasteful price for
joining a convention drawn to advance the laws ofwar. In fact, we must not, and
need not, give recognition and protection to terrorist groups as a price for
progress in humanitarian law.
The time has come for us to devise a solution for this problem, with which the
United States is from time to time confronted. In this case, for example, we can
reject Protocol I as a reference for humanitarian law, and at the same time devise
an alternative reference for the positive provisions of Protocol I that could be of
real humanitarian benefit if generally observed by parties to international armed
conflicts. We are therefore in the process of consulting with our allies to develop
appropriate methods for incorporating these positive provisions into the rules
that govern our military operations, and as customary international law. I will
advise the Senate of the results of this initiative as soon as itis possible to do so.
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I believe that these actions are a significant step in defense of traditional
humanitarian law and in opposition to the intense efforts of terrorist
organizations and their supporters to promote the legitimacy of their aims and
practices. The repudiation of Protocol I is one additional step, at the ideological
level so important to terrorist organizations, to deny these groups legitimacy as
international actors.
Therefore, I request that the Senate act prompdy to give advice and consent to
the ratification of the agreement I am transmitting today, subject to the
understandings and reservations that are described more fully in the attached
report. I would also invite an expression of the sense of the Senate that it shares
the view that the United States should not ratify Protocol I, thereby reaffirming
its support for traditional humanitarian law, and its opposition to the
politicization of the law by groups that employ terrorist practices.

RONALD REAGAN
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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washin~ton, December 13, 1986.
THE PRESIDENT
The White House.
THE PRESIDENT: I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to
transmission to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, Protocol II
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of12 August 1949, concluded at Geneva
onJune 10, 1977.
PROTOCOL II
Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions was negotiated by diplomatic
conference convened by the Swiss Government in Geneva, which met in four
annual sessions from 1974-77. This Protocol was designed to expand and refine
the basic humanitarian provisions contained in Article 3 common to the four
1949 Geneva Conventions with respect to non-international conflicts. While
the Protocol does not (and should not) attempt to apply to such conflicts all the
protections prescribed by the Conventions for international armed conflicts,
such as prisoner-of-war treatment for captured combatants, it does attempt to
guarantee that certain fundamental protections be observed, including: (1)
humane treatment for detained persons, such as protection from violence,
torture, and collective punishment; (2) protection from intentional attack,
hostage-taking and acts of terrorism ofpersons who take no part in hostilities, (3)
special protection for children to provide for their safety and education and to
preclude their participation in hostilities, (4) fundamental due process for persons
against whom sentences are to be passed or penalties executed; (5) protection and
appropriate care for the sick and wounded, and medical units which assist them;
and (6) protection of the civilian population from military attack, acts of terror,
deliberate starvation, and attacks against installations containing dangerous
forces. In each case, Protocol II expands and makes more specific the basic
guarantees of common Article 3 of the 1949 Conventions. Its specific provisions
are described in greater detail in the attached section-by-section analysis.
The final text of Protocol II did not meet all the desires of the United States
and other western delegations. In particular, the Protocol only applies to internal
conflicts in which dissident armed groups are under responsible command and
exercise control over such a part of the national territory as to carry out sustained
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and concerted military operations. This is a narrower scope than we would have
desired, and has the effect of excluding many internal conflicts in which dissident
armed groups occupy no significant territory but conduct sporadic guerrilla
operations over a wide area. We are therefore recommending that u.s.
ratification be subject to an understanding declaring that the United States will
apply the Protocol to all conflicts covered by Article 3 common to the 1949
Conventions (and only such conflicts), which will include all non-international
armed conflicts as traditionally defined (but not internal disturbances, riots and
sporadic acts ofviolence). This understanding will also have the effect of treating
as non-international these so-called "wars of national liberation" described in
Article 1 (4) of Protocol I which fail to meet the traditional test ofan international
conflict.
Certain other reservations or understandings are also necessary to protect u.s.
military requirements. Specifically, as described in greater detail in the attached
annex, a reservation to Article 10 is required to preclude the possibility that it
might affect the administration of discipline of U.S. military personnel under
The Uniform Code of Military Justice, under the guise of protecting persons
purporting to act in accordance with "medical ethics." However, this is
obviously not intended in any way to suggest that the United States would
deliberately deny medical treatment to any person in need of it for political
reasons or require U.S. medical personnel to perform procedures that are
unethical or not medically indicated.
Also, we recommend an understanding with respect to Article 16 to confirm
that the special protection granted by that article is required only for a limited
class of objects that, because of their recognized importance, constitute a part of
the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and that such objects will lose their
protection if they are used in support of the military effort. This understanding is
generally shared by our allies, and we expect it to appear in the ratification
documents of many of them.
Finally, we recommend an understanding to deal with any situation in which
the United States may be providing assistance to a country which has not ratified
Protocol II and would therefore feel under no obligation to comply with its
terms in the conduct of its own operations. Our recommended understanding
would make clear that our obligations under the Protocol would not exceed
those of the State being assisted. The United States would of course comply with
the applicable provisions of the Protocol with respect to all operations conducted
by its own armed forces.
With the above caveats, the obligations contained in Protocol II are no more
than a restatement of the rules of conduct with which U.S. military forces would
almost certainly comply as a matter of national policy, constitutional and legal
protections, and common decency. These obligations are not uniformly
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observed by other States, however, and their universal observance would
mitigate many of the worst human tragedies of the type that have occurred in
internal conflicts of the present and recent past. I therefore strongly recommend
that the United States ratify Protocol II and urge all other States to do likewise.
With our support, I expect that in due course the Protocol will be ratified by the
great majority of our friends, as well as a substantial preponderance of other
States.
The Departments of State, Defense, and Justice have also conducted a
thorough review of a second law-of-war agreement negotiated during the same
period-Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of12 August 1949.
This Protocol was the main object of the work of the 1973-77 Geneva
diplomatic conference, and represented an attempt to revise and update in a
comprehensive manner the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the protection of war
victims, the 1907 Hague Conventions on means and methods of warfare, and
customary international law on the same subjects.
Our extensive interagency review of the Protocol has, however, led us to
conclude that Protocol I suffers from fundamental shortcomings that cannot be
remedied through reservations or understandings. We therefore must
recommend that Protocol I not be forwarded to the Senate. The following is a
brief summary of the reasons for our conclusion.
In key respects Protocol I would undermine humanitarian law and endanger
civilians in war. Certain provisions such as Article 1 (4), which gives special status
to "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination
and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of
self-determination," would inject subjective and politically controversial
standards into the issue of the applicability of humanitarian law. Protocol I also
elevates the international legal status of self-described "national liberation"
groups that make a practice of terrorism. This would undermine the principle
that the rights and duties of international law attach principally to entities that
have those elements of sovereignty that allow them to be held accountable for
their actions, and the resources to fulfill their obligations.
Equally troubling is the easily inferred political and philosophical intent of
Protocol I, which aims to encourage and give legal sanction not only to "national
liberation" movements in general, but in particular to the inhumane tactics of
many of them. Article 44(3), in a single subordinate clause, sweeps away years of
law by "recognizing" that an armed irregular "cannot" always distinguish
himself from non-combatants; it would grant combatant status to such an
irregular anyway. As the essence of terrorist criminality is the obliteration of the
distinction between combatants and non-combatants, it would be hard to square
ratification of this Protocol with the United States' announced policy of
combatting terrorism.
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The Joint ChiefS of Staff have conducted a detailed review of the Protocol,
and have concluded that it is militarily unacceptable for many reasons. Among
these are that the Protocol grants guerrillas a legal status that often is superior to
that accorded to regular forces. It also unreasonably restricts attacks against
certain objects that traditionally have been considered legitimate military targets.
It fails to improve substantially the compliance and verification mechanisms of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and eliminates an important sanction against
violations of those Conventions. Weighing all aspects of the Protocol, the Joint
ChiefS ofStaff found it to be too ambiguous and complicated to use as a practical
guide for military operations, and recommended against ratification by the
United States.
We recognize that certain provision of Protocol I reflect customary
international law, and others appear to be positive new developments. We
therefore intend to consult with our allies to develop appropriate methods for
incorporating these provisions into rules that govern our military operations,
with the intention that they shall in time win recognition as customary
international law separate from their presence in Protocol L This measure would
constitute an appropriate remedy for attempts by nations to impose unacceptable
conditions on the acceptance of improvements in international humanitarian
law. I will report the results of this effort to you as soon as possible, so that the
Senate may be advised of our progress in this respect.
CONCLUSION
I believe that U.S. ratification of the agreement which I am submitting to you
for transmission to the Senate, Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, will
advance the development of reasonable standards of international humanitarian
law that are consistent with essential military requirements. The same is not true
with respect to Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and this agreement
should not be transmitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. We
will attempt in our consultations with allies and through other means, however,
to press forward with the improvement ofthe rules ofinternational humanitarian
law in international armed conflict, without accepting as the price for such
improvements a debasement of our values and of humanitarian law itself
The effort to politicize humanitarian law in support of terrorist organizations
have been a sorry development. Our action in rejecting Protocol I should be
recognized as a reaffirmation of individual rights in international law and a
repudiation of the collectivist apology for attacks on non-combatants.
Taken as a whole, these actions will demonstrate that the United States
strongly supports humanitarian principles, is eager to improve on existing
international law consistent with those principles, and will reject revisions of
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intemationallaw that undermine those principles. The Departments ofState and
Justice support these recommendations.
Respectfully submitted.
GEORGE P. SHULTZ

Attachments:
1-Detailed Analysis of Provisions
2-Recommended Understanding and Reservations
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TABLE AS-1

STATES PARTY TO THE
GENEVA CONVENTIONS AND
THEIR ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS

AS OF 15 OCTOBER
1997
• States party to the 1949
Geneva Conventions: 188
• States party to the 1977
AdditionalProtocolI: 147
• States having made the
declaration under Article
90 of Protocol I: 50
• States party to the 1977
Additional Protocol II:
140

The following tables show which States were
party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to
the two Additional Protocols of 1977, as of 15
October 1997. They also indicate which States
had made the optional declaration under Article
90 of 1977 Protocol I, recognizing the
competence of the International Fact-Finding
Commission. The names of the countries given in
the tables may differ from their official names.
The dates indicated are those on which the
Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs
received the official instrument from the State that
was ratifying, acceding to or succeeding to the
Conventions and Protocols or accepting the
competence of the International Fact-Finding
Commission. Apart from the exceptions
mentioned in the footnotes at the end of the tables,
for all States the entry into force of the
Conventions and of the Protocols occurs six
months after the date given in the present
document; for States which have made a
declaration of succession, entry into force takes
place retroactively, on the day of their accession to
independence.
Abbreviations
Ratification (R): a treaty is generally open for
signature for a certain time following the conference
which has adopted it. However, a signature is not
binding on a State unless it has been endorsed by
ratification. The time limits having elapsed, the
Conventions and the Protocols are no longer open for
signature. The States which have not signed them may
at any time accede or, where appropriate, succeed to
them.
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Accession (A): instead of signing and then ratifying a
treaty, a State may become party to it by the single act
called accession.
Declaration of Succession (S): a newly independent
State may declare that it will abide by a treaty which was
applicable to it prior to its independence. A State may
also declare that it will provisionally abide by such
treaties during the time it deems necessary to examine
their texts carefully and to decide on accession or
succession to some or all of them (declaration of
provisional application). At present no State is bound by
such a declaration.
Reservation/Declaration (RID): a unilateral
statement, however phrased or named, made by a State
when ratifying, acceding or succeeding to a treaty,
whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal
effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their
application to that State (provided that such reservations
are not incompatible with the object and purpose ofthe
treaty).
Declaration provided for under Article 90 of
Protocol I (D 90): prior acceptance of the
competence of the International Fact-Finding
Commission.
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PROTOCOL II

CONVENTIONS
COUNTRY

RIAlS

RID

RIAlS

RID

Afglunisl2n
....Ib:mi,

26.09.1956

R

27.05.1957

R

16.07.1993

....Igeri'
.... ndam

20.06.1960

....

16.08.1989

....
....

X

17.09.1993

....

.... ngoh

20.09.1984

....

20.09.1984

....

X

.... ntigu' ,nd B,rbud2

06.10.1986

5

06.10.1986

....

.... rgentina

18.09.1956

R

26.11.1986

....

Armenia
.... usmli,

07.06.1993

....

07.06.1993

....

121.06.1991

R

X

Awrril
Azerbaijan
B,hanus
B,hrain

27.08.1953

113.08.1982

R

X

B'ngladesh
B,rb,dos
Behrus
Belgium

Belizc
Benin

Bhul2n
Bolivi,
Bosnil-Herzegovim
BotsW2f12

Bruil
Brunei DU1lSS2hm
Bulgari,
Burkina F2so
Burundi
Cambodi,

C2meroon
Canad2
C'peVerdc
Cenrnl African Republic
Chad
Chile
China
Colombi,
Comoros

Congu
COSI2 Rica

Cotc d'lvoire
Croatia
Cub,
Cyprus
C:zech Repubbc

Dennurk
Djibouti
Dorninic:a
Dominion Republic
Ecu,dor
Egypr
EI Salvador

EQu:norial Guineoa

14.10.1958

!
I

01.06.1993

R

X

X

R

D90

16.07.1993

X

16.08.1989

16.08.1989

....

26.11.1986

....

07.06.1993

....

23.09.1992

21.06.1991

R

13.08.1982

13.08.1982

R

....
....
....
....

X

X

....

11.07.1975

5

10.04.1980

....

10.04.1980

....

30.10.1986

....

30.10.1986
08.09.1980

5
5
03.08.1954
R
03.09.1952 1 R
29.06.1984
....
14.12.1961
5
....
10.01.1991
10.12.1976
R
31.12.1976
5
....
29.03.1968
29.06.1957
R
....
14.10.1991
R
22.07.1954
07.11.1961
5
27.12.197\
5
....
08.12.1958
16.09.1963
5
14.05.1965
R
....
11.05.1984
01.08.1966
5
....
05.08.1970
12.10.1950
R
28.12.1956
R
08.11.1961
R
21.11.1985
A
04.02.1967
5
....
15.\0.1969
28.12.1961
5
11.05.1992
5
15.04.1954
R
....
23.05.1962
05.02.1993
5
27.06.1951
R
06.03.1978 1
5
28.09.1981
5
22.01.1958
A
11.08.1954
R
10.11.1952
R
17.06.1953
R
24.07.1986
A

08.09.1980

....

X

19.02.1990

....

X

23.10.1989
I 20.05.1986

R

04.04.1972

I
I

~I

06.10.1986
11.10.1996

30.11.197\
10.09.1968

RID

RIAlS

X

X

23.10.1989

27.03.1987

20.05.1986

29.06.1984

....

29.06.1984

28.05.1986

....

28.05.1986

RI
R'

I

I

....'
.... 1

~I

08.12.1983

....

10.08.1992

08.12.1983

31.12.1992

5

31.12.1992

31.12.1992

23.05.1979

23.11.1993

14.10.1991

....
....
....

26.09.1989

R

09.05.1994

20.10.1987

R

10.06.1993

....

10.06.1993

....

05.05.1992

X

R

19.02.1990
23.10.1989

16.03.1984

....

20.11.1990

R

16.03.1995

....

X

23.05.1979

....

05.05.1992
14.10.1991

....
....

26.09.1989

R

20.10.1987

R

16.03.1984

....

20.11.1990

20.11.1990

R

16.03.1995

16.03.1984

A

....

17.07.1984

A

17.07.1984

17.01.1997

....

17.01.1997

....

24.04.1991

R

24.04.1991

R

14.09.1983

A

14.09.1983

A

01.09.1993

A

21.11.1985

24.04.1991

X

14.08.1995

A

....

21.11.1985

....

10.11.1983

A

10.11.1983

A

15.12.1983

....

15.12.1983

A

20.09.1989

R

20.09.1989

R

11.05.1992

11.05.1992

5

18.03.1996

A

02.05.1995

05.02.1993

5

17.06.1982

17.06.1982

R

11.05.1992

5

25.11.1982

....

01.06.1979

R

05.02.1993

5
R

17.06.1982

17.04.1996

X

....
....

08.04.1991

A

25.04.1996

25.04.1996

A

26.05.1994

....

26.05.1994

A

10.04.1979

R

10.04.1979

R

08.04.1991

09.10.1992

R

09.\0.1992

R

23.11.1978

R

23.11.1978

R

24.07.1986

....

24.07.1986

A

X

X

X
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COUNTRY
Estoma

RIAlS

RID

PROTOCOL I
RID

RIAlS

PROTOCOL II
D90

RID

RIAlS

18.01.1993

A

18.01.1993

A

18.01.1993

A

Ethiopia

02.10.1969

R

08.04.1994

A

08.04.1994

A

Fiji

09.08.1971

S
07.08.1980

R

07.08.1980
24.02.19842

R

Finland

22.02.1955

R

France

28.06.1951

R

Glbon

26.02.1965

S

08.04.1980

A

08.04.1980

A

Gamhi..

20.10.1966

S

12.01.1989

A

12.01.1989

A

Georgia
Gemuny

14.09.1993

A

14.09.1993

A

14.09.1993

A

03.09.1954

A

14.02.1991

R

14.02.1991

R

R

4
28.02.1978

R

15.02.1993

A

X

3

Ghana

02.08.1958

A

28.02.1978
31.03.1989

R

Greece

05.06.1956

R

Grenadl

13.04.1981

S

Guatenub.

14.05.1952

R

19.10.1987

Guinea

11.07.1984

A

11.07.1984

R
A

Gumea-Biss2u

21.02.1974

A

21.10.1986

Guyana

22.07.1968

S

H:uti

11.04.1957

A

X

X

X

07.08.1980

14.02.1991

A

19.10.1987

R

11.07.1984

A

A

21.10.1986

A

18.01.1988

A

18.01.1988

A

21.11.1985

R

16.02.1995

R

20.12.1993

Holy See

22.02.1951

R

21.11.1985

R

Honduras

31.12.1965

A

16.02.1995

R

12.04.1989

R

23.09.1991

12.04.1989

R

10.04.1987

R

X

10.04.1987

10.04.1987

R

X

27.02.1986

Hung>ry

03.08.1954

R

Icel2nd

10.08.1965

A

Inm3

09.11.1950

R

X

X

Indonesia

30.09.1958

A

Iran (Islamic Rep. oQ

20.02.1957

R

Iraq

14.02.1956

A

Ireland

27.09.1962

R

Israel

06.07.1951

R

1uly

17.12.1951

R

27.02.1986

R

27.02.1986

R

Jam:uCl

20.07.1964

S

29.07.1986

A

29.07.1986

A

J'pan
Jortbn
K,..khsun

21.04.1953

A

29.05.1951

A

01.05.1979

R

01.05.1979

R

05.05.1992

S

05.05.1992

S

05.05.1992

S

Kenya

20.09.1996

A

Kmbati

05.01.1989

X

X

X

X

X

S

Korea (Oem. Peop!e', Rep. oQ 27.08.1957
5
Kore, (Republic oQ
16.08.1966

A

X

09.03.1988

A

A

X

15.01.1982

R

15.01.1982

R

Kuwait

02.09.1967

A

X

17.01.1985

A

17.01.1985

A

KYrg)'73"n
Lto People's Oem. Rep.

18.09.1992

S

18.09.1992

S

18.09.1992

S

29.10.1956

A

18.11.1980

R

18.11.1980

R

utvi:a

24.12.1991

A

24.12.1990

A

24.12.1991

A

Lebanon

10.04.1951

R

23.07.1997

A

23.07.1997

A

X

Lesotho

20.05.1968

S

20.05.1994

A

20.05.1994

A

Libena

29.03.1954

A

30.06.1988

A

30.06.1988

A

LIbyan Arab J,m,hiriy,

22.05.1956

A

07.06.1978

A

07.06.1978

A

Liechtenstein

21.09.1950

R

X

10.08.1989

R

10.08.1989

R

Llthuam;a

03.10.1996

A
29.08.1989

R

R

X

01.09.1993

S

X

10.08.1989
12.05.1993

29.08.1989

X

01.09.1993

01.09.1993

S

27.07.1993

08.05.1993

R

Luxembourg

01.07.1953

R

Macedonia

01.09.1993

S

M'wg=>r
Mabwi

18.07.1963

S

08.05.1992

R

07.10.1991

A

07.10.1991

A

05.01.1968

A

Mabysia
M,ldives
M,li

24.08.1962

A

18.06.1991

A

03.09.1991

A

03.09.1991

A

24.05.1965

A

08.02.1989

A

08.02.1989

A

M;alta

22.08.1968

S

17.04.1989

A

17.04.1989

A

X

17.04.1989

X

X
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CONVENTIONS
RIAlS
RID

Mauritania
Mauritius

30.10.1962

Mexico

Micronesia
MoldoV2 (Republic 01)

19.09.1995
24.05.1993

Maruca

05.07.1950

R

Mongolia

20.12.1958

A

Morocco
MOZlmbique

26.07.1956

A

14.03.1983

A

My:mnur

25.08.1992

A

RID

RIAlS

PROTOCOL II
D90

RID

RIAlS

S

14.03.1980

A

14.03.1980

A

18.08.1970

S

22.03.1982

A

22.03.1982

A

29.10.1952

R

10.03.1983

A

A

19.09.1995

A

19.09.1995

A

A

24.05.1993

A

24.05.1993

A

06.12.1995

A

06.12.1995

06.12.1995

A

14.03.1983

A

17.06.1994

A

21.07.1994

17.06.1994

A

26.06.1987

26.06.1987

R

08.02.1988

08.02.1988

R
R

6

Namibia

22.08.1991

Nep.1

07.02.1964

A

Netherhnds

03.08.1954

R

New Zc2hnd

02.05.1959

R

Niangu.

17.12.1953

R

S

X

26.06.1987

R

08.02.1988

R

X

X
X

Niger

21.04.1964

S

08.06.1979

R

08.06.1979

Nigeri.

20.06.1961

S

10.10.1988

A

10.10.1988

A

Norway

03.08.1951

R

14.12.1981

R

14.12.1981

R

Onun

31.01.1974

A

29.03.1984

A

29.03.1984

A

PakiSl2n

12.06.1951

R

P.hu

25.06.1996

A

25.06.1996

A

25.06.1996

A

PalUnu

10.02.1956

A

18.09.1995

A

18.09.1995

A

Papua New Guinea

26.05.1976

S

Pangu.y

23.10.1961

R

30.11.1990

A

30.11.1990

A

Peru

R

14.07.1989

R

14.07.1989

R

Philippines

15.02.1956
7
06.10.1952

Pohnd

26.11.1954

R

23.10.1991

R

14.12.1981

X

Porrug>1

14.03.1961

R

15.10.1975

A

Ronunia
Russian Feder2tion

01.06.1954

R

10.05.1954

R

RW2nda

05.05.1964

S

Saint Kitts :and Nevis

14.02.1986

Saint Luoa

18.09.1981

X

X

R

Qatar
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X
X
X
X

27.05.1992

R

05.04.1988

A

11.12.1986

A

02.10.1992

23.10.1991

R

01.07.1994

27.05.1992

R

X

24.09.1991
13.05.1995

21.06.1990

R

X

29.09.1989

29.09.1989

R

08.07.1993

19.11.1984

A

21.06.1990

R

29.09.1989

R

19.11.1984

A

S

14.02.1986

A

14.02.1986

A

S

07.10.1982

A

07.10.1982

A

Sline Vincent & Grcmdincs 01.04.1981
52mo2
23.08.1984

A

08.04.1983

A

08.04.1983

A

S

23.08.1984

A

S:mMarino

29.08.1953

A

05.04.1994

R

Sao Tome and Principe

21.05.1976

A

05.07.1996

A

S.udiAnbi.

18.05.1963

A

21.08.1987

A

X

23.08.1984

A

05.04.1994

R

05.07.1996

A

X

Seneg>1

18.05.1963

S

07.05.1985

R

SeycheDes

08.11.1984

A

08.11.1984

A

Siem. Leone

10.06.1965

S

21.10.1986

A

Sing>pore

27.04.1973

A

SloV2o.

02.04.1993

S

02.04.1993

S

13.03.1995

02.04.1993

S

Slovenia

26.03.1992

S

26.03.1992

S

26.03.1992

26.03.1992

S

Solomon Islands

06.07.1981

S

19.09.1988

A

19.09.1988

A

Sonuli:a

12.07.1962

A

South Africa

31.03.1952

A

21.11.1995

A

Sp.in

R

21.04.1989

R

Sri !.:Inb

04.08.1952
8
28.02.1959

Sudan

23.09.1957

A

Suriname

13.10.1976

S

16.12.1985

A

16.12.1985

A

SW2zihnd

28.06.1973

A

02.11.1995

A

02.11.1995

A

Sweden

28.12.1953

R

31.08.1979

R

31.08.1979

31.08.1979

R

Swil7Crhnd

9
31.03.1950

R

17.02.1982

R

17.02.1982

17.02.1982

R

X

22.05.1992

X

21.04.1989

07.05.1985

R

08.11.1984

A

21.10.1986

A

21.11.1995

A

21.04.1989

R

R

X

X
X

X
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COUNTRY
Syrian Arab Republic

GENEVA
CONVENTIONS
RIAlS
RID

PROTOCOL I
RIAlS

RID

PROTOCOL II
D90

RIAlS

RID

02.11.1953

R

14.11.1983

T2jikistm

13.01.1993

S

13.01.1993

S

Tanzania (United Rep. oQ

12.12.1962

S

15.02.1983

A

Thailand

29.12.1954

A

The Former Y.R. Macedonia

01.09.1993

S

01.09.1993

S

01.09.1993

01.09.1993

S

Togo

06.01.1962

S

21.06.1984

R

21.11.1991

21.06.1984

R

Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago

13.04.1978
10
24.09.1963

A

Tunisia

04.05.1957

A

09.08.1979

R

09.08.1979

R

Turkey

10.02.1954

R

Turkmenisun

10.04.1952

S

10.04.1992

S

10.04.1992

S

TUV2lu

19.02.1981

S

Uganda
Uknine
United Anb Emir.nes

18.05.1964

A

03.08.1954

R

10.05.1972

A

United Kingdom

23.09.1957

R

X

United Stl[CS of America

02.08.1955

R

X

Uruguay

05.03.1969

R

X

Uzbeldstm

08.10.1993

A

Vanuatu

27.10.1982

A

Venezueb

13.02.1956

R

VlctN:am

28.06.1957

A

Yemen

16.07.1970

A

Yugoslavia

21.04.1950

R

Zambia

19.10.1966

Zimbabwe

07.03.1983

A

X
10.09.1997

13.01.1993

S

15.02.1983

A

S

13.03.1991

A

25.01.1990

R

09.03.1983

A

13.12.1985

A

08.10.1993

A

28.02.1985

A

28.02.1985

A

X

19.10.1981

R

X

17.04.1990

R

17.04.1990

R

X

11.06.1979

R

11.06.1979

R

A

04.05.1995

A

04.05.1995

A

A

19.10.1992

A

19.10.1992

A

X

On 21 June 1989, the Swiss Federal Department of
Foreign AfEtirs received a letter from the Permanent
Observer of Palestine to the United Nations Office
at Geneva informing the Swiss Federal Council
"that the Executive Committee of the Palestine
Liberation Organization, entrusted with the
functions of the Government ofthe Government of
the State of Palestine by decision of the Palestine
National Council, decided, on 4 May 1989, to
adhere to the Four Geneval Conventions of 12
August 1949 and the two Portocols addiitonal
thereto".

X

13.03.1991

A

25.01.1990

25.01.1990

R

06.03.1992

09.03.1983

A

13.12.1985

A

08.10.1993

A

17.07.1990

X

X

On 13 September 1989, the Swiss Federal Council
informed the States that it was not in a position to
decide whether the letter constituted an instrument
of accession, "due to the uncertainty within the
international community as to the exismece or
non-existence of a State of Palestine".

1 Dijibouti's declaration of succession in respect of the First Convention was dated 26 January 1978.
2 On accession to Protocol II, France made a communication concerning Protocol 1.
3 Entry into force on 7 December 1978.
4 Entry into force on 7 December 1978.
5 Entry into force on 23 September 1977, the Republic of Korea having invoked Art. 62/611141/157
common ot the First, Second, Thrid and Fourth Conventions respecitvely (immediate effect).
6 An instrument ofaccession to the Geneva Conventions and their additional Protocols was deposited by
the United Nations Council for Namibia on 18 October 1983. In an instrument deposited on 22 Augus 1991,
Namibia declared its succession to the Geneva Conventions, which were previously applicable pursuant to
South Africa's accession on 31 March 1952.
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7 The first Geneva Convention was ratified on 17 March 1951.
8 Accession to the Fourth Geneva Convention on 23 February 1959 (Ceylon had signed only the First,
Second, and Third Convenitons).
9 Entry into force on 21 October 1950.
10 Accession to the First Geneva Convention on 17 May 1963.

Source: International Committee of the Red Cross, 15 October 1997. (A
current listing ofparties to the Geneva Conventions and to Additional Protocol I
and II may be found at www.icrc.ch/icrcnews).

